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 Foreign relations is one of the most complex and demanding functions of any 
government in the world. It requires a delicate and flexible approach ranging from 
diplomatic persuasion to military force to solve a multitude of intricate issues. Conditions 
on the world stage shift so often that tactics that worked in the past can fail in the 
modern world. Unlike domestic affairs that fall under the direct authority of a nation’s 
central government, there is no central authority to manage the international system. 
Each state acts as its own player in the most realistic game possible by conducting 
business and waging war with its neighbors to achieve desirable outcomes for national 
wealth and power. According to proponents of executive authority in foreign policy 
however, some players seem to suffer from multiple personality disorder when more 
than one institution within the central government voices conflicting opinions on the 
course of foreign policy. 
 In the case of the United States, some scholars believe that the President should 
be able to exercise primary authority on the world stage, while Congress takes a back 
seat and allows the President to speak with one voice on behalf of the people of the 
United States. The problem with this approach is the danger of granting too much power 
to any single leader to control the nation’s foreign policy. The Founding Fathers 
designed Congress to be responsive to the desires of the people including on matters of 
foreign relations. The Constitution specifically outlines numerous powers Congress has 
to formulate foreign policy including the power to regulate foreign commerce, control 
funding for foreign programs, and declare war. Despite Congress’ Constitutional 
authority on foreign policy, years of deference to the President’s Commander in Chief 
Congressional Foreign Policy 3 
 
power during the first decades following World War II resulted in a large accumulation of 
Presidential authority on foreign relations. The horrors of the Vietnam War served as a 
wake up call on the problems of unchecked Presidential power and Congress attempted 
to correct this imbalance with increased involvement, but the President still retains a 
distinct advantage in foreign relations from his ability to veto Congressional legislation, 
host foreign diplomats, command the military, and use executive agreements to 
substitute treaties that require consent from the Senate. 
 Despite the President’s advantage, Congress can still affect foreign policy in a 
positive manner through a variety of methods ranging from direct legislation to more 
indirect and informal tactics that are not as noticeable. Congressional involvement can 
vary along two dimensions: more or less active, and deferent or assertive. 
Congressional inactivity does not necessarily translate to deference nor does increased 
activity mean that Congress opposes the President every time. Congress can be very 
active in support of the President or remain less active but choose its battles with the 
President on foreign policy. As seen during the Presidency of George W. Bush, 
Congress will be more deferent when the President’s proposals have popular support 
during a “rally around the flag” situation as a result of the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001, but Congress will act more assertively when the President’s 
policies, like the occupation of Iraq, lose popularity among the people. 
Evaluation of Congressional Involvement in Foreign Policy 
 To understand effectively the nature of Congress’ role in foreign policy, one must 
first sift through and challenge the criticisms made against Congressional involvement. 
After one dismisses the negative viewpoints as unwarranted, one can then see the 
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variety of methods members of Congress can employ to influence foreign policy in a 
positive manner. 
Congressional Counterattack 
 Many in the field of political science hold a negative stigma about the role of 
Congress in foreign policy. Most previous studies by these political scientists focus on 
the constitutional prerogatives of the President and Congress, gains in authority relative 
to the President, or the harm that results from Congress getting involved. James 
Lindsay divides these critics into two camps in his book Congress and the Politics of US 
Foreign Policy: Irreconcilables and Skeptics. The Irreconcilables are typically 
administration officials and their supporters that whole-heartedly support the authority of 
the President to speak with one voice on foreign policy matters.1 According to the 
Irreconcilables, an “Imperial Congress” only weakens the President’s ability to make 
effective decisions on policy and compromises the United States’ position on the world 
stage by conveying division, conflict, and disorganization.2 However, Lindsay argues 
their fears of an Imperial Congress are exaggerated. Even though Congress does 
challenge the President on some occasions, such opposition hardly constitutes a coup 
d’état by Congress.3 The President retains control of foreign policy matters regardless 
of any challenges made by Congress.4 Presidential dominance has its origins from 
decades of Congressional deference fueling the broad interpretation of the Commander 
in Chief power beginning after the United States abandoned previous positions of 
                                                          
1 Lindsay, J. M. (1994). Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, pp. 2-3. 
2 Lindsay, pp. 2-3. 
3 Lindsay, pp. 3. 
4 Lindsay, pp. 3. 
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isolationism to pursue a leadership role on the world stage following World War II.5 The 
haunting fear of nuclear annihilation by the Soviet Union during the Cold War prompted 
Congress to defer to the President on several matters pertaining to foreign policy and 
national security.6 The President’s ability to veto legislation from Congress also adds 
considerable power to the President on foreign policy matters. 
 The other group of critics is academic skeptics that question Congress’ ability to 
translate foreign policy preferences into legal substance.7 The studies carried out by 
skeptics like Barbara Hinckley, author of Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy 
Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress, seek to discredit the role of Congress 
in foreign policy by citing the inability of Congress to pass substantive legislation directly 
outlining its policies.8 Despite Congress’ difficulty in passing bills with actual substance, 
Lindsay argues that Congress can affect foreign policy in indirect ways that are more 
subtle than and not as noticeable as concrete direct legislation.9 As stated by Ralph 
Carter and James Scott in their book, Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional 
Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs, Hinckley focuses too much emphasis on formal roll call 
votes when Congress has several informal tools that operate below the normal radar.10 
As Rebecca Hersman eloquently stated in her book, Friends and Foes: How Congress 
and the President Really Make Foreign Policy,  
 Dramatic clashes over high-profile issues---“waves”---are important, but they do 
 not tell all, or even most, of the story. It is in the “ocean”---the day-to-day 
                                                          
5 Lindsay, pp. 21. 
6 Lindsay, pp. 24. 
7 Lindsay, pp. 3. 
8 Carter, R. G. & Scott, J. M. (2009). Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy 
Entrepreneurs. Duke University Press, pp. 7. 
9 Lindsay, pp. 3. 
10 Carter and Scott, pp. 7-8. 
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 interactions over unexceptional issues---where most foreign policy is shaped, 
 debated, and made.11 
Hinckley also neglects to include the impact Congress’ appropriations power has over 
the direction of defense spending on the foreign policy arena.12 Hinckley also makes the 
mistake of looking at Congressional involvement in one dimension when Carter and 
Scott reveal that Congressional involvement contains two dimensions: active versus 
inactive, and assertive versus deferent.13 Stephen Weissman, author of A Culture of 
Deference: Congress’ Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy, used Hinckley’s 
conclusions to reveal Congress’ deference and argued that Congress needed to get 
involved, yet he conceded the fact that individual members can play a role in foreign 
policy formation.14 Lindsay, Hersman, Carter and Scott all write about the power 
individual members have to greatly influence foreign policy, particularly the members 
that are within the committees that have jurisdiction over foreign policy decisions. As 
Hersman put it, individual members can serve as leaders of “issue clusters,” which 
group together not just members of Congress, but also executive agencies, interest 
groups and non-governmental organizations all under one umbrella issue in the foreign 
policy arena. In some cases, the strength of this coalition of support can be enough to 
induce positive changes in foreign policy.15 
 Lindsay states that both groups of critics commit three fallacies when discrediting 
Congressional involvement in foreign policy. The first is the adversarial fallacy, which 
                                                          
11 Hersman, R. K. C. (2000). Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign 
Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 3 
12 Carter and Scott, pp. 8 
13 Carter and Scott, pp. 10 
14 Weissman, S. R. (1995). A Culture of Deference: Congress’ Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy. 
New York: BasicBooks, pp. 178-179 
15 Hersman, pp. 8. 
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assumes that the President and Congress are always fighting each other on the foreign 
policy agenda.16 In fact, Lindsay points out that there is often more cooperation than 
conflict, especially when Presidential initiatives also appear on the Congressional 
agenda.17 Sometimes, the President will ask Congress to weigh in on foreign affairs.18 
Congress may appear internally divisive at times, but the executive branch can be just 
as fragmented especially when elements of the administration are left out by the 
President, which can result in alliances forming between members of Congress and 
these disgruntled executive officials that can effectively challenge the President’s 
policies.19 
 The second fallacy is the technocratic fallacy meaning that members of Congress 
do not conduct serious oversight initiatives to enforce its policies and are content with a 
solitary focus on their legislative work.20 However, Congressional committees often hold 
serious hearings to assess the implications of pending foreign policy and execute 
oversight against wayward programs, but these hearings sometimes go unnoticed by 
the media.21 Oversight hearings also occur less often because the bureaucracies 
typically do the right thing when executing policies and investigative panels rarely 
uncover critical violations.22 Regardless of their frequency, members of Congress have 
strong incentives to use the media when conducting policy oversight to champion a 
                                                          
16 Lindsay, pp. 6-7. 
17 Lindsay, pp. 7. 
18 Lindsay, pp. 7. 
19 Lindsay, pp. 7. 
20 Lindsay, pp. 5. 
21 Lindsay, pp. 6. 
22 Lindsay, pp. 5. 
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cause, respond to problems in the implementation of policies, and even indirectly sway 
the President’s agenda.23  
 The last fallacy is the electoral fallacy. Many assume members of Congress will 
only focus on reelection and will only act upon the wishes of the voters they represent.24 
The average voter knows very little about the interactions associated with foreign policy 
and expresses minimal interest on the subject.25 As a result, members of Congress will 
avoid acting seriously on foreign relations because it serves no electoral interest.26 This 
simple electoral explanation discourages Congressional involvement in foreign policy 
and validates the following expectations. First, members of Congress will defer to the 
President on the substance of foreign policy because constituents lack specific interest 
in foreign affairs and support the President on foreign policy issues.27 It would be 
politically dangerous for members of Congress to challenge the President because it 
would mark them as unpatriotic in the eyes of the average voter.28 Congressional 
members will also only get involved in foreign policy when the issue attracts constituent 
interest because of the subsequent domestic impact.29 When Congress does get 
involved in foreign policy, members will engage in grandstanding tactics to use the 
media to show constituents they care about their interests, but the goal of this media 
circus is to win electoral support and not to affect policy substance.30 The problem with 
the simple electoral explanation is that none of these expectations played out after the 
Vietnam War. The Vietnam War opened the eyes of the American people on the 
                                                          
23 Lindsay, pp. 6. 
24 Lindsay, pp. 3-4. 
25 Lindsay, pp. 3. 
26 Lindsay, pp. 3-4. 
27 Lindsay, pp. 35-36. 
28 Lindsay, pp. 35-36. 
29 Lindsay, pp. 37. 
30 Lindsay, pp. 36-37. 
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dangers of too much power for the President and the threat of nuclear weapons from 
the Soviet Union, but Congress acted in other areas of foreign relations besides 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union and remained active long after the war ended.31 Lindsay 
argues that the lack of knowledge on foreign policy by the average voter actually allows 
members to get more involved in foreign affairs because they are free to pursue their 
own policies unburdened by traditional constituent constraints because of voter 
disinterest.32 Congressional Members only have to avoid the foreign policy options their 
constituents disapprove of, but still have other favorable options to pursue.33 Members 
of Congress might have to answer to specific advocacy groups and some interested 
constituents, but they generally have leeway to pursue their own ideological interests on 
foreign affairs and promote the role of the United States on the world stage as they see 
fit.34 
Congressional Foreign Policy Tools 
 James Lindsay groups Congressional actions into three distinctive categories: 
direct, substantive legislation, indirect, procedural legislation, and informal, non-
legislative tactics. Direct substantive legislation involves Congress dictating its foreign 
policy preferences into traditional legislation. Procedural legislation modifies the 
structure and procedure of how foreign policy is made and executed to create 
interpretations supported by Congress instead of attacking the actual policy substance. 
Informal methods largely refer to the ability of members of Congress to meet with the 
                                                          
31 Lindsay, pp. 38. 
32 Lindsay, pp. 4. 
33 Lindsay, pp. 45. 
34 Lindsay, pp. 4. 
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President or foreign dignitaries to discuss foreign policy, and the use of the media by 
members of Congress to shape an issue in a favorable light. 
Substantive Legislation 
 Direct legislation is the traditional method Congress uses to enact any of its 
policies either domestic or foreign. In general, Congress has tremendous authority to 
legislate on several matters because of Congress’ numerous powers outlined in Article 
I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. However, legislation on the subject of foreign policy 
is more complicated because the President and Congress share powers relating to 
foreign policy. Article II, Section 2 names the President Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces with the ability to negotiate treaties and appoint ambassadors to foreign 
nations with the advice and consent of the Senate.35 Article II, Section 3 grants the 
President the ability to receive foreign ambassadors and other leaders to negotiate 
international relations.36 On the other side, Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the 
power to control the appropriation of federal funds for international programs, provide 
for the common defense, regulate commerce with foreign nations, define and punish 
piracies and felonies on the ocean, declare war, raise and support armies, provide and 
maintain the navy, and make rules for governing and regulation of land and naval forces 
in addition to the ability to provide legislation based upon any of these powers.37 Despite 
Congress’ several powers in the foreign policy arena, a growing trend of broadly 
interpreting the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority dating back to the start of the 
Cold War placed the President at the helm of making foreign policy decisions. The fear 
of nuclear war and total annihilation at the hands of the Soviet Union caused the 
                                                          
35 U.S. Constitution, Art. II § 2. 
36 U.S. Constitution, Art. II § 3. 
37 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8. 
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American people and Congress to put their faith in broad executive authority on the 
world stage.38 Members of Congress viewed their roles in foreign policy as supplying 
the President with whatever he needed to protect American interests abroad.39 The 
failures of the President during the Vietnam War opened the eyes of the people and 
Congress, who now questioned the pervasive threat of Communist expansion and 
Presidential authority.40 Although Congress acts more frequently in foreign policy than 
years before Vietnam, members of Congress failed to reverse the precedent of 
Presidential authority in foreign relations established during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Congress now must act in an auxiliary role on foreign policy matters and use whatever 
tools it has in its arsenal to modify the President’s agenda to incorporate Congress’ 
policy preferences. 
 The three main areas that Congress can legislate on foreign policy are through 
declarations of war, regulation of international trade, and appropriations.41 A declaration 
of war is the farthest step Congress can take in international relations, which happened 
only four times in the history of the United States: the War of 1812, the Spanish-
American War, World War I, and World War II in addition to a recognition of a state of 
war during the Mexican-American War (The Civil War was undeclared because such 
recognition would legitimize the Confederacy as a sovereign nation and not an 
insurrectionist group).42 Congress can also authorize the use of military force by the 
President abroad.43 Due to the rise of the Commander-in-Chief power of the President, 
Congress’ war powers diminished in prominence since the broad interpretation of 
                                                          
38 Lindsay, pp. 21. 
39 Lindsay, pp. 23-24. 
40 Lindsay, pp. 24. 
41 Lindsay, pp. 84. 
42 Lindsay, pp. 84-85. 
43 Lindsay, pp. 85. 
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Commander-in-Chief included the ability to decide when and where to commit armed 
forces.44 Congress attempted to regain control of the deployment of armed forces 
through the War Powers Resolution, but it lacked the teeth necessary to hold the 
President accountable for committing armed forces abroad without Congressional 
support, and it is political suicide for members of Congress to deny funds to the military 
when the lives of American soldiers are on the line.45 
 Instead of war powers, Congress can use its powers over foreign commerce and 
appropriations to influence policy. Rather than arguing over the constitutionality of war-
related decisions made by Congress, most debate over the use of trade powers and the 
power of the purse center on political prudence rather than the actual constitutionality of 
the action.46 Congress can use its regulation of foreign commerce to reward cooperative 
nations with favorable trade agreements while punishing disruptive countries with 
economic sanctions.47 Congress’ control over appropriations can greatly influence 
foreign programs by controlling how the United States spends its money through 
discretionary spending. Through discretionary spending, Congress determines how 
much to spend on programs that the President wants, which could be the full amount 
requested or none at all.48 Control over military funding could also limit future military 
engagements abroad since the military requires Congressional funding to carry out its 
operations.49 It may be politically unwise to deny the military funding while operations 
are underway, but Congress can prescribe less military funding before war breaks out 
as a check against military engagement. 
                                                          
44 Lindsay, pp. 85. 
45 Lindsay, pp. 149. 
46 Lindsay, pp. 86, 88. 
47 Lindsay, pp. 85. 
48 Lindsay, pp. 86. 
49 Lindsay, pp. 86-87. 
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 The Senate is in a unique position regarding foreign policy because the 
Constitution requires two-thirds approval from the Senate on all treaties and 
ambassador appointments made by the President.50 This forces the President to cater 
treaties to the preferences of a supermajority of senators in order for a treaty to become 
binding, and will concede to the Senate on disagreements concerning the content of the 
treaty.51 When the Senate receives a treaty, it can proceed along one of four routes. It 
can either approve the treaty, reject it outright thereby killing the treaty, refuse to 
consider it and withhold consent to pass it later which is a temporary measure, or 
modify the treaty.52 To modify the treaty, the Senate can attach an amendment through 
a simple majority or incorporate non-binding reservations and understandings, which 
outline how the Senate interprets the treaty and what the agreement entails.53 If these 
reservations and understandings are agreed upon, it becomes part of the law.54 In some 
cases, senators can attach amendments or understandings that they know the other 
party will reject, which allows the Senate to reject a treaty under the guise of trying to 
improve it.55 Since all appropriation bills must start in the House of Representatives, the 
House can influence a treaty by denying funds to execute the treaty unless their 
preferences are included too.56 Despite the tremendous power Congress, particularly 
the Senate, wields over treaties, the President can bypass the Senate with an executive 
agreement, which are just as binding and legal as a formal treaty.57 However, Congress 
can counter by requiring executive agreements to be subjected to a joint resolution 
                                                          
50 Lindsay, pp. 77. 
51 Lindsay, pp. 81. 
52 Lindsay, pp. 78-80. 
53 Lindsay, pp. 80. 
54 Lindsay, pp. 81. 
55 Lindsay, pp. 81. 
56 Lindsay, pp. 87. 
57 Lindsay, pp. 81. 
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made by both chambers in support of the agreement if the issue of the agreement 
concerns trade policies or previous legislation that requires Congressional approval 
before executing the agreement as seen during the 2006 negotiations between 
President George W. Bush and India on a nuclear agreement that required 
Congressional authorization to waive portions of the Atomic Energy Act.58 
 Despite Congress’ numerous powers to influence foreign policy through 
legislation, treaties, and agreements, there are several disadvantages to the traditional 
legislative process. The first negative aspect is that some foreign policy matters are 
outside Congress’ jurisdiction.59 Congress does not have the power to negotiate abroad 
on behalf of the United States, and it cannot compel the President to do so.60 Congress 
can try to enact legislation that limits the negotiating leverage of the President, but this 
rarely succeeds because of the second inherent drawback.61 Even if Congress can 
muster up enough support to pass a bill through both chambers, it must still overcome 
one monumental obstacle: a Presidential veto. To override a veto, Congress needs two-
thirds majorities in both the House and the Senate, which is hard to come by as 
Congress becomes more partisan and divided under polarizing party leaderships. The 
President can easily prevent a supermajority by persuading only a small minority to 
oppose the bill and prevent Congress from obtaining enough votes.62 Congress can 
also handcuff itself on the legislative process if there is not a strong enough consensus 
that Congress needs to act against the President on foreign policy.63 Some opposers to 
                                                          
58 Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. U.S. Public Law 
109-401. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 18 December 2006. 
59 Lindsay, pp. 89. 
60 Lindsay, pp. 89. 
61 Lindsay, pp. 89. 
62 Lindsay, pp. 90. 
63 Lindsay, pp. 90. 
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action argue that other issues require Congress’ attention, while others feel the 
President should take the lead on foreign policy and do not want to challenge a popular 
President.64 Lastly, substantive legislation is too rigid and limited to be effective in 
international relations.65 World events can easily render legislation moot and outdated.66 
In some sensitive cases, diplomacy works best behind closed doors, but legislation is 
too public to properly address such conditions.67 Foreign policy requires a flexible 
approach that can only be executed by the President, and direct legislation would be 
analogous to using a sledgehammer in a situation that requires a scalpel. Legislative 
bills also run the risk of being water-downed to reach a compromise in Congress, which 
can result in an ineffective law worse than inaction itself.68 Remedies to these 
drawbacks often involve giving the President the ability to waive provisions of the law as 
he deems necessary, but this involves Congressional concessions of power over 
foreign policy to the President.69 
 Despite the numerous problems of substantive legislation, Congress can turn this 
negative into a positive by threatening the President with legislation to draw out 
concessions on the substance of foreign policy. Congress can shape legislation to the 
point where executive officials will prefer Presidential concessions over Congressional 
legislation.70 Congress can also hold other policy topics hostage to force the President 
to concede.71 Foreign nations will make conciliatory gestures if it perceives that 
                                                          
64 Lindsay, pp. 90-91. 
65 Lindsay, pp. 91. 
66 Lindsay, pp. 91. 
67 Lindsay, pp. 92. 
68 Lindsay, pp. 92-93. 
69 Lindsay, pp. 91. 
70 Lindsay, pp. 94. 
71 Lindsay, pp. 95. 
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Congress will threaten to legislate unfavorable trade relations or economic sanctions.72 
The use of threats to get concessions assumes that there is room for a compromise 
between the two positions and largely depends upon strong Congressional support that 
can override a veto to make the threats credible.73 The threat of legislation does have 
risks though because the President may not carry out his end of the bargain.74 Even 
worse, Congress can miscalculate the intentions of the President and the law actually 
passes resulting in something worse than Congress intended.75 However, so long as 
members of Congress can get concessions out of the President on foreign policy 
issues, they are willing to let legislative initiatives fail. 
Procedural Legislation 
 Unlike substantive legislation, which dictates the content of foreign policy, 
procedural legislation affects the structures and procedures of foreign policy making.76 
In this way, Congress can change policy content by changing the underlying decision-
making processes.77 Congress can use procedural legislation to mold the bureaucracy 
to act upon Congress’ interpretations and preferences in foreign policy content. Several 
of these procedural tactics operate outside normal visibility and are overlooked by 
skeptics only focusing on major pieces of legislation, or Hersman’s “waves.” The 
expansion of scope to include procedural legislation takes into account a larger picture 
of the “ocean” itself. 
 Procedural legislation falls into five categories: creation of new agencies and 
executive positions, alteration of the participants in foreign policy decision-making, 
                                                          
72 Lindsay, pp. 95. 
73 Lindsay, pp. 94, 96. 
74 Lindsay, pp. 97. 
75 Lindsay, pp. 96. 
76 Lindsay, pp. 99. 
77 Lindsay, pp. 99. 
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legislative vetoes, new procedural mandates, and reporting requirements.78 Congress 
can create new executive agencies to rectify perceived failures in the executive 
branch.79 Members of Congress understand that policies without an advocate 
organization will die in a bureaucracy and new agencies can be created to champion 
the issues Congress supports.80 These new agencies often receive additional clout and 
influence when Congress determines how the new agencies will interact with existing 
organizations and who answers to whom, which usually leads to Congressionally 
supported agencies taking the lead in the bureaucracy.81 
 Despite the advantages of creating new agencies to conduct foreign policy, the 
introduction of new organizations requires a major overhaul of bureaucratic relations.82 
Instead, Congress can either remove current agencies from the decision-making 
process or add new participants that already exist and favor Congressional 
preferences.83 In one instance, Congress can delegate Presidential responsibilities to 
an executive agency in sync with the Congressional agenda.84 The President would be 
unable to impede upon this group’s operations because he would be viewed as blocking 
the mandate of an executive agency that functions within the administration itself.85 
Congress can also add private organizations to the policy-making process as advisors 
to the President, but also as Congressional watchdogs designed to keep members of 
the organization and Congress in the loop of Presidential dealings and the eventual 
                                                          
78 Lindsay, pp. 101. 
79 Lindsay, pp. 102. 
80 Lindsay, pp. 102. 
81 Lindsay, pp. 102. 
82 Lindsay, pp. 103. 
83 Lindsay, pp. 103. 
84 Lindsay, pp. 103. 
85 Lindsay, pp. 103. 
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effect of foreign policy programs.86 In some cases, Congress can legislate themselves 
into the decision-making process by creating commissions composed of members of 
Congress to advise the President and even get involved in negotiations with foreign 
nations directly while the President is required to keep them up to date on the 
proceedings.87 
 A very powerful procedural provision Congress can use in legislation is the 
legislative veto. It gives the President the policies he wants, but Congress reserves the 
right to pass a simple (one chamber) or concurrent (both chambers) resolution that 
withdraws Congressional support for the legislation if such policies fail, and any 
resolution under a legislative veto is immune from a Presidential veto.88 However, the 
Supreme Court ruled in the 1983 case, INS v Chadha, that legislative vetoes were 
unconstitutional because they violated the spirit of bicameralism and separation of 
powers.89 Although Congress revised its laws on a case-by-case basis, several other 
laws retained legislative vetoes and Congress continued to incorporate legislative 
vetoes into new pieces of legislation despite the court ruling.90 Both Congress and the 
President ignore Chadha because both branches prefer legislative vetoes over 
substantive legislation because the President gets the green light to execute his policies 
while Congress still retains a way to reel in the President if his policies are not 
effective.91 If Congress is not satisfied with the progress of Presidential policies or 
opposes legislation that is not in effect yet, Congress can pass a joint resolution 
blocking the policy even though such resolutions are not immune from a Presidential 
                                                          
86 Lindsay, pp. 103-104. 
87 Lindsay, pp. 104. 
88 Lindsay, pp. 105. 
89 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
90 Lindsay, pp. 105. 
91 Lindsay, pp. 106. 
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veto under Chadha.92 However, the President will usually comply with such provisions 
because he knows that his policies are more likely to die on Capitol Hill under normal 
Congressional procedures than with the attachment of reporting requirements and other 
tools Congress uses to remain in the policy loop.93 
 Congress can use procedural mandates to restrict the actions the President 
within acceptable parameters. The President still runs the day-to-day operations of 
foreign policy, but Congress constrains what the President can do.94 In some cases, 
Congress can grant the President a large amount of discretion to conduct foreign policy, 
but can conversely make the operating window so narrow that it is nearly impossible for 
the President to avoid limitations from Congress.95 The same tactic also works to limit 
the behavior of foreign nations by threatening to withhold foreign aid if foreign countries 
stray outside the accepted range outlined by Congress.96 
 Lastly, one of Congress’ more popular procedural tools is reporting requirements 
designed to establish goals that Presidential policies must meet while keeping Congress 
up to date on the progress of its implementation.97 There are three variations to 
reporting requirements. Notification provisions require the executive branch to inform 
Congress whenever it undertakes certain specified actions outlined in the authorizing 
legislation.98 Periodic reports require the President to report on the status of programs 
at predetermined time intervals or when individual milestones are met.99 Lastly, 
Congress can request one time reports to conduct legislative studies, some of which 
                                                          
92 Lindsay, pp. 106. 
93 LIndsay, pp. 106. 
94 Lindsay, pp. 107. 
95 Lindsay, pp. 107. 
96 Lindsay, pp. 107-108. 
97 Lindsay, pp. 108. 
98 Lindsay, pp. 108. 
99 Lindsay, pp. 108. 
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can be used to inform constituents on the possible domestic effects such legislation will 
have on them.100 Along with remaining in the loop, reporting requirements allow 
Congress to intervene early to curtail Presidential policies when they begin to fail in their 
mandates.101 With reporting requirements, Congress can conduct foreign policy 
oversight and mobilize Congressional action against Presidential initiatives while 
promoting the exchange of information across multiple agencies.102 
 Despite the several advantages of procedural legislation, there are some flaws 
that can unravel the power of procedural legislation, chief among them occurs when the 
legislation is too vaguely worded to be effective.103 It is possible to attribute legislative 
weakness to members of Congress watering down the bill to get Congressional and 
Presidential support and shield themselves from blame if such policies fail.104 Some 
members use procedural legislation to make Congress look invisible from the process 
for their own protection, but blame avoidance is not enough to fully explain the problems 
of procedural legislation. It assumes that constituents are intelligent when it comes to 
the demands of Congress, but not the costs of such legislation.105 Interest groups are in 
a better position to determine if members of Congress use procedural legislation for 
blame avoidance or serious policy formation.106 The vagueness of legislation better 
explains its failures, and if procedural legislation is too weak, the President can find 
loopholes and maneuver around procedural requirements to achieve the policies he 
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wants without subjecting to Congress.107 The President may follow the limits of the law, 
but not act upon the intent of the law by reporting bad news discreetly or making it 
harder for Congress to change course.108 Oversight over Presidential actions requires 
substantial Congressional time and resources to be effective. As the costs of police 
work rise, members of Congress can become less inclined to detect executive non-
compliance.109 Some programs, particularly the covert operations of the CIA, are too 
secretive for Congress to effectively monitor.110 It can also be very hard for members of 
Congress to even prove non-compliance occurred if executive decisions were 
judgement calls based upon vague legislation.111 Even if Congress can detect non-
compliance, there is a large cost to effectively punish such non-compliance that requires 
credible commitments of Congressional resources, which plagued the War Powers 
Resolution because it is politically unwise to withhold funding from the military during a 
war.112 The executive branch has little incentive to comply to Congressional mandates if 
there is no imminent punishment against non-compliance.113 Congress may be able to 
derail covert operations by leaking sensitive information, but it is very hard for Congress 
to force executive agencies to adopt new policy positions than stop the old ones.114 
Congress can try to hold other programs hostage, but such threats need to be credible 
and legitimacy fades when some members are personally invested in some 
programs.115 Congress cannot counter executive non-compliance if weak legislation 
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allows the President to maneuver around restrictions. Pieces of procedural legislation 
that effectively close loopholes are likely to succeed in forcing the President to operate 
within the acceptable boundaries Congress establishes. 
Informal Non-Legislative Tactics 
 Congress’ informal, non-legislative practices can be just as effective on foreign 
policy issues as substantive and procedural legislation. The first informal tactic is called 
Congressional diplomacy, which pertains to members of Congress getting involved in 
diplomatic exchanges.116 Some members of Congress can pursue a “Lone Ranger” 
approach and conduct their own foreign policy negotiations, but this is very rare 
because the Logan Act prevents private American citizens from negotiating with foreign 
powers unless specifically authorized by the American government.117 Individual 
negotiations run the risk of derailing Presidential policy decisions while making 
alternative policies difficult to achieve. To spur positive Congressional involvement in 
negotiations, the President can invite members of Congress onto discussion panels as 
advisors or Congress can demand the President to include Congress in the 
deliberations.118 The President might seek to incorporate Congressional members into 
the diplomatic process because members of Congress might be less willing to strike 
down the proposals drafted by their colleagues.119 Regardless of Congressional support 
for such proposals, the inclusion of Congressional members in diplomatic negotiations 
allows Congress to be more involved in the formation of foreign policy. The most 
common form of Congressional diplomacy occurs when foreign dignitaries meet with 
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members of Congress to exchange information, talk about foreign affairs, and lobby 
members for certain policies.120 The President will support such meetings when he can 
gain further support for his policies, but such meetings can blur the lines between 
informal discussions and Lone Ranger diplomacy.121 By meeting with members of 
Congress, foreign dignitaries can gain insight into the modes of operation on Capitol Hill 
and how to work the American political system to get what they want, but Congress also 
benefits because foreign nations will often have to temper their actions to satisfy the 
mood on Capitol Hill and achieve their ends.122 The opposite scenario applies as well 
because members of Congress can learn how foreign governments operate and how to 
get what they want from other nations.123 Through these informal meetings, both 
members of Congress and foreign dignitaries understand what proposals either side will 
agree to, and side deals can be made between foreign nations and Congress that can 
ultimately bypass the President’s positions.124 With pressures from both foreign nations 
and Congress to pursue the same agreement, the President ends up handcuffed into 
accepting the side deal made between members of Congress and foreign countries. 
 Congress can also take on an informal approach to foreign policy through private 
consultations with the President. The President might seek out the advice of Congress 
to gain political support for his policies, but Congress might have to use legislation or 
sheer persistence to get its own involvement in foreign policy negotiations.125 Genuine 
dialogue between Congress and the President can be hard to achieve because the 
President does not want restrictions on its policies, and members of Congress disagree 
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on how much involvement the President should extend to Congress.126 Some members 
feel that the President only needs to keep Congress in the loop, while others want 
Congress to play a larger role, yet both conditions are subject to the willingness of the 
President.127 It is easy for the President to seek Congressional advice on policies they 
both approve, but the President will be less likely to invite Congress to challenge his 
policies.128 Instead of relying upon the President to seek out Congress, members of 
Congress have to legislate themselves more involvement and seek out meetings with 
the President to discuss foreign policy issues. 
 The last and most powerful informal tool Congress can use is the ability to frame 
the media to gain popular support for certain issues. The increasingly advanced 
technologies available allow members of Congress to reach millions of people instantly 
and inexpensively.129 The attitudes about media usage are different that in the past. 
Previously, members of Congress viewed legislators that sought the public spotlight as 
grandstanders.130 However, it has become acceptable and common practice for 
members of Congress to use the media and the internet to get their messages out to 
their constituents and the other American citizens.131 Congress can use the media to 
publicly reveal the problems of the administration’s policies and the need for the general 
public to oppose the President’s programs.132 Congress can also use public committee 
hearings to bring in expert witnesses that will advocate positions Congress approves on 
a public medium like C-SPAN or political news organizations like CNN and Fox News. 
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Members of Congress can release Congressional reports to the public and make 
speeches on the floor in front of television cameras to support their policy preferences. 
If Congress can gather enough popular support for its policies, it can tip the debate 
between Congress and the President in Congress’ favor and encourage members of 
Congress to pursue a more active role in foreign policy.133 
 Although each has its own drawbacks, Congress has several methods it can use 
to affect foreign policy. Congress can legislate directly on the substance of foreign 
policy based upon its constitutional powers pertaining to declarations of war, regulation 
of trade, and appropriations of funds. Congress can also use procedural legislation and 
reporting requirements to affect the structures and procedures of decision-making 
process of foreign policy and limit the policies the President can do. Lastly, Congress 
can employ non-legislative techniques like the media and meetings with foreign leaders 
and the President to promote Congress’ foreign policy preferences. 
Congressional Involvement in the Foreign Policy of George W. Bush 
 After one understands the tools Congress can use to influence foreign policy, 
one can better analyze specific pieces of legislation and see the role Congress played. 
In their book, Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy 
Entrepreneurs, Ralph Carter and James Scott used several volumes of Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac to code and analyze involvement by individual members of 
Congress on several foreign relations issues including foreign policy, defense policy, 
appropriations, and international trade and finance.134 Carter and Scott recognized that 
individual members interested in foreign policy are able to spearhead initiatives as 
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frontrunners to what Hersman defined as “issue clusters.” Carter and Scott’s study 
focused on only new introductions of policy and not subsequent pieces of legislation on 
spending unless members of Congress raised new issues on such programs.135 Any 
single activity on legislation by a member of Congress counted in their study, and some 
members engaged in multiple activities on a single piece of legislation.136 Carter and 
Scott considered Congressional activity as any one of the following ways Congress 
could be involved in foreign policy: introducing legislation and resolutions; proposing 
amendments in committees, subcommittees or on the floor; attending committee 
hearings; issuing Congressional reports; speaking on the floor or giving public 
statements; proposing motions to recommit (or kill) legislation; citing someone for 
contempt of Congress; engaging in fact-finding missions; enacting procedures on 
legislation; consulting with others on foreign policy; and participating in lawsuits.137 
 Considering the data Carter and Scott collected from post-WWII to post-Cold 
War, they expected to see more Congressional foreign policy involvement from 
individual members during the first decade of the twenty-first century, which 
encompasses the Presidency of George W. Bush.138 There would be a slight decrease 
in involvement following September 11, 2001, but a resurgence in involvement would 
occur afterwards.139 As seen in the following table based upon data for 2003 and 2005, 
67 members of Congress engaged in 172 acts of involvement in foreign policy issues.140 
Entrepreneur 
Characteristics 
Overall 
Average 
2003 2005 
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Entrepreneur 
Characteristics 
Overall 
Average 
2003 2005 
# of Entrepreneurs 33.5 33 34 
# of Acts of 
Entrepreneurship 
86 73 99 
 
This data set excludes 26 freshman members that each engaged in only one act each 
because these new members did not establish themselves as entrepreneurs at the start 
of their careers.141 If Carter and Scott included the freshman members, there would 
have been 87 acts in 2003 and 111 acts in 2005, which only reinforces the conclusion of 
a rise in Congressional involvement between 2003 and 2005.142 The average number of 
members getting involved in foreign policy rose from the post-Cold War 1990s which 
averaged only 26.2 active members.143 The average number of acts between the two 
periods actually dropped from 106 to 86.144 Based upon this data, one can expect to 
find that 2002 marked a low point of Congressional involvement in foreign policy and 
Congress became steadily more active as time passed with larger numbers of 
involvement predicted for 2006, 2007, and 2008 due to the controversies of the Iraq 
War and the subsequent shift of Congressional control over to the Democratic party 
following the 2006 elections.145 
 Carter and Scott’s data proved several of their predictions to be accurate. 
Individual members of Congress became increasingly active as time passed to 
incorporate their preferences into foreign policy. Carter and Scott’s data paints the trend 
of a more deferential Congress during Bush’s first term, and a more active and assertive 
                                                          
141 Carter and Scott, pp. 254 
142 Carter and Scott, pp. 254 
143 Carter and Scott, pp. 210 
144 Carter and Scott, pp. 210-211 
145 Carter and Scott, pp. 211 
Congressional Foreign Policy 28 
 
Congress during Bush’s second term first among the Republican majority and then 
among the subsequent Democratic majority. 
 However, Carter and Scott’s data focuses on the activities of individual members 
and not the collective work of Congress. It is also unclear what specific actions Carter 
and Scott coded and what the outcomes of such actions were. Under their parameters, 
if a member of Congress speaking at a hearing is a single Congressional initiative, then 
ten members speaking at the same hearing could be coded as ten distinct initiatives. 
Individual actions are a major component of Congressional involvement in foreign 
policy, but they do not give the broader picture necessary to determine the level of 
activity and assertiveness from Congress as an institution. 
 The use of Congressional Quarterly Almanac by Carter and Scott is a good 
baseline to analyze how Congress acted on major foreign policy legislation, but it is not 
enough to get a larger picture of Congressional involvement because it omits the 
activities of committees to conduct hearings, particularly oversight hearings that allow 
members of Congress to challenge the practices of the executive branch. An effective 
study of Congressional involvement in foreign policy should not focus on just the entries 
in the 2001-2008 volumes of Congressional Quarterly Almanac pertaining to foreign 
relations, defense, trade, and related appropriations. It should also include the hearings 
and investigative prints featured in the CIS Index for the committees that have 
jurisdiction over foreign policy, which are the House and Senate Foreign Affairs and 
Armed Services Committees along with the related subcommittees under the 
Appropriations Committee. The combination of legislation from Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac and the non-legislative activity in CIS Index will better reveal Congressional 
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involvement in foreign policy during the Presidency of George W. Bush. After each 
period’s legislative history will follow a table outlining the use of Lindsay’s Congressional 
foreign policy tools, the average amount Congress used each tool per year, and the 
percentage of successes for assertive pieces of legislation. Another table will reveal the 
number of hearings and investigative prints of each of the foreign policy committees for 
that time period, the average amount of committee activity, and how many hearings 
were oversight hearings. The full tables detailing each provision in the legislative 
histories, which serves as the foundations for the featured Congressional policy tools 
tables, will be outlined in the Appendix. 
2001-2004: Congressional Deference 
 The terrorist attacks that hit the World Trade Center in New York City and the 
Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia on September 11, 2001 devastated the United States 
and left its citizens in a state of paralyzing shock, mournful sorrow, and heated anger. 
Sadness and rage soon transformed into a surging wave of patriotism and popular 
support for President George W. Bush and his national security policies to rid the world 
of terrorism. September 11th is an example of a “rally-‘round-the-flag” effect, which 
occurs when a national leader takes advantage of patriotic feelings during a crisis 
situation to gather popular support for specific policies.146 In response, members of 
Congress began deferring to President Bush on several foreign policy issues because 
members of Congress did not want to appear disloyal or unsupportive of a popular 
President during a time of crisis in the eyes of their constituents. The broad authority 
Bush received a week after the attacks to conduct military operations against al-Qaeda 
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and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is a clear indication of Congressional deference 
to a popular President. Congress passed 420-1 in the House and 98-0 in the Senate the 
authorization of the use of military force and granted Bush the authority to 
 Use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
 persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
 attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
 persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
 United States by such nations, organizations or persons.147 
In prior authorizations for war, Congress never gave the President the broad authority to 
use force against organizations or individuals to prevent future attacks, and the wording 
of this legislation presented Bush a green light to launch a global “war on terror” 
beginning with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. 
Simultaneously, Congress unanimously passed an emergency supplemental 
appropriations bill that granted a total of $40 billion for recovery, relief aid, and defense 
reinforcement in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.148 Bush immediately received $10 
billion to spend at his discretion, $5.9 billion of which went to defense programs.149 Bush 
also received an additional $10B after submitting his proposals to Congress for 
spending the money, and Bush committed $8.1 billion more to defense.150 Congress 
authorized the other $20 billion in the Fiscal Year 2002 Appropriations Bill. A few 
months later, Congress gave the President the ability to waive sanctions against 
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Pakistan and provide foreign aid to Pakistan for the purpose of building an alliance to 
conduct military operations in Afghanistan.151 In exchage for Congressional support, 
Bush needed to certify that economic aid to Pakistan would foster democratic rule in the 
country.152 By the end of 2001, the United States was at war with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, and President Bush had the support of patriotic American citizens and a 
deferential Congress. 
 After scoring a political victory with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
President Bush set his sights on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Many in the Bush 
administration believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and Bush 
thought he already had legal justification to pursue war against Iraq due to its failures to 
comply with United Nations sanctions, but Bush conceeded and announced he would 
appear before Congress and the UN to seek approval for a military invasion of Iraq.153 
Bush negotiated the language of the resolution before it landed in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and drafted legislation granting him the authority to use force to 
 defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat 
 posed by Iraq, and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council 
 resolutions regarding Iraq.154 
Bush agreed to drop language calling on the United States to “restore international 
peace and security to the region” because many Congressional members feared that 
                                                          
151 A bill to authorize the President to exercise waivers of foreign assistance restrictions with respect to 
Pakistan through September 30, 2003, and for other purposes. U.S. Public Law 107-57. 107th Cong., 1st 
sess., 27 October 2001. 
152 A bill to authorize the President to exercise waivers of foreign assistance restrictions with respect to 
Pakistan through September 30, 2003, and for other purposes. U.S. Public Law 107-57. 107th Cong., 1st 
sess., 27 October 2001. 
153 “Hill Backs Use of Force in Iraq” (2002). Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (Vol. 58, pp. 9-3--9-6). 
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
154 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. U.S. Public Law 107-243. 
107th Cong., 2nd sess., 16 October 2002. 
Congressional Foreign Policy 32 
 
this could justify military action elsewhere.155 Bush also agreed to certify that diplomacy 
could not solve this problem and to seek UN approval despite it not being required.156 
When Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SC) wanted more clarity in the 
legislation about Bush’s authority under the law and specific requirements to use 
peaceful tactics before war, Bush broke off negotiations with the Senate and struck a 
new deal with House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and persuaded House 
Internaitonal Relations Chairman Henry Hyde (R-IL) to call a mark up hearing as added 
pressure on Gephardt.157 Gephardt stunned many Democrats with his deal with 
President Bush, but Gephardt did not want to look to weak on national security as he 
planned out his future Presidential campaign for 2004.158 Gephardt stated he regretted 
not voting for the Persian Gulf War in 1991, but others felt that anti-war Democrats Jim 
McDermott (D-WA) and Daivd Bonior (D-MI) embarrassed him with their disapproval for 
Bush’s policy towards Iraq.159 The International Relations Committee reported out a bill 
that gave Bush the latitude he wanted to conduct military operations in Iraq, but needed 
to report to Congress within sixty days of the start of hostilities instead of the ninety 
days Bush proposed.160 Despite several concerns emerging during floor debates about 
the coming war in Iraq, many Democrats voted for the bill to avoid looking weak on 
security and appear unpatriotic to their constituents because they opposed a popular 
President. Bush praised the bipartisan votes of 296-133 in the House and 77-23 in the 
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Senate as America speaking with one voice.161 Two months after the bill passed, the 
UN Security Council gave its approval for a resolution giving Iraq one more chance to 
comply with UN mandates.162 Bush supported the resolution, but told the UN that the 
United States would make its own determination of Iraqi compliance and would act 
independently if necessary.163 On March 20, 2003, Bush finally launched the invasion 
and occupation of Iraq as authorized by the broad legislation Congress approved. 
 When startling evidence of abuse and torture surfaced out of Abu Ghraib prison 
in Iraq, the House and Senate each passed a non-binding resolution condemning the 
abuses and calling for a Congressional investigation.164 However, the House and 
Senate Armed Services, International Relations, and Judiciary Committees all shot 
down resolutions requesting the Bush administration to provide documents on the 
abuses for investigation.165 The foreign policy committees stepped aside on the issue 
and left the investigation up to the Pentagon and military officials. 
 Despite the amount of Congressional deference to President Bush following 
September 11th, Congress did enact one assertive piece of legislation involving 
sanctions against Syria. Bush opposed the imposition of sanctions on Syria, but 
members of Congress were upset over Syria’s tolerance of terrorism by granting 
terrorists the ability to cross its borders to launch attacks in Iraq against the American 
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occupation forces.166 Other members of Congress protested Syria’s occupation of its 
neighbor, Lebanon, and its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction.167 
Many pro-Israel interest groups, including the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee 
lobbied hard for Congressional sanctions, and Bush eventually dropped his objections 
to sanctions because of Syria’s failure to halt terrorism and assist in the Middle East 
peace process.168 Bush also probably supported the legislation because there was 
enough Congressional support to override a Presidential veto based upon the final vote 
totals: 398 to 4 in the House, 89 to 4 in the Senate, and 408 to 8 in the House to 
approve the Senate’s amendment to the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act of 2003. The legislation banned the exportation of “dual use items” to 
Syria, which are commerical items that also have military applications.169 Congress also 
required the President to impose any two of the following sanctions: halting all US 
exports to Syria except food and medicine, prohibiting investment in Syria by American 
companies, restricting Syrian diplomats to a 25 mile radius around New York City and 
Washington, DC, banning all Syrian aircraft from US airspace, reducing diplomatic 
contacts, and freezing Syrian assets in the US.170 The State Department had to also 
keep Syria on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the sanctions would be lifted 
only when Syria withdrew from Lebanon, ended its support of terrorism, and halted its 
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programs for weapons of mass destruction.171 However, the President still reserved the 
ability to waive the sanctions if there was a compelling national security interest, but 
Bush needed to report to Congress on his reasons for waiving the sanctions.172 
2001-2004 # of actions # of deferent 
actions 
# of assertive 
actions 
# of successful assertive 
actions for Congress 
% of  successful 
assertive actions for 
Congress 
Substantive 14 5 9 3 33.33% 
Procedural 3 0 3 1 33.33% 
Informal 2 1 1 1 100% 
Congressional 
Procedure 
2 1 1 0 0% 
Total 21 7 14 5 35.71% 
Average Per 
Year 
5.25 1.75 3.5 1.25 35.71% 
 
 The table above describes a less active and deferent Congress. In total, 
Congress acted on foreign policy only 21 times from 2001-2004, most of which 
consisted of substantive pieces of legislation. Although Congress initiated more 
assertive actions than deferent ones, only 35% of those assertive pieces of legislation 
were successful. There were more deferent actions than successful assertive ones 
which confirms the deferent attitude Congress adopted during the first term of President 
Bush. The deferent legislation that Congress enacted granted Bush considerable power 
to act upon his policy preferences, particularly the broad ability to launch two wars.  
Committees (2001-
2004) 
Hearings Oversight 
Hearings 
% of 
Oversight 
Hearings 
Investigative 
Prints 
Total 
Committee 
Activity 
Average 
Committee 
Activity Per Year 
House Armed 
Services 
83 38 45.78% 2 85 21.25 
House Foreign 
Affairs 
320 38 11.88% 20 340 85 
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Committees (2001-
2004) 
Hearings Oversight 
Hearings 
% of 
Oversight 
Hearings 
Investigative 
Prints 
Total 
Committee 
Activity 
Average 
Committee 
Activity Per Year 
House 
Appropriations 
Defense 
Subcommittee 
11 0 0% 0 11 2.75 
House 
Appropriations 
Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee 
23 0 0% 1 24 6 
Senate Armed 
Services 
66 23 34.85% 1 67 16.75 
Senate Foreign 
Relations 
192 52 27.08% 26 218 54.5 
Senate 
Appropriations 
Defense 
Subcommittee 
6 0 0% 0 6 1.5 
Senate 
Appropriations 
Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee 
4 0 0% 0 4 1 
Totals 705 151 21.42% 50 755 188.75 
Average Per Year 176.25 37.75 21.42% 12.5 188.75 ---- 
 
 The activity from the foreign policy committees also paints the picutre of a less 
active and deferent Congress. The levels of activity from the House and Senate Armed 
Services and Foreign Affairs Committees far exceeded the amount of activity from the 
Appropriations Subcommittees. The hearings that the Appropriations Subcommittees 
held all pertained to purely legislative matters unlike the several oversight hearings 
conducted by the other committees. Congress as a whole averaged approximately 188 
informal actions within the committees, with a vast majority of such actions consisting of 
Congressional hearings. Despite Congress’ occasional oversight hearings, only 21% of 
all committee hearings involved oversight of previous foreign policy programs. Not only 
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did Congress grant the President tremendous power to pursue his policies, but 
Congress also did not hold the President responsible for his policy choices either. 
 Although Congress was able to be assertive on Syria, this represented a minor 
divergence from the trend of Congressional deferrence to President Bush on foreign 
policy issues that dominated the first term of the Bush Presidency. Members of 
Congress granted Bush broad authority to launch military campaigns in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq because the President enjoyed the popular support of patriotic 
Americans that wanted Bush’s policies to fight terrorism and rogue regimes. Congress 
could not oppose Bush on foreign policy because such opposition would label them as 
unsupportive and traitors to their constituents. As Bush’s policies began to lose support 
during his second term however, Congress gained an opportunity to reassert itself and 
get back into the game of foreign policy formation. 
2005-2006: Rise of Congressional Assertiveness 
 By the start of President Bush’s second term, approval for the President and the 
occupation of Iraq was fading rapidly. Many American soldiers returned home in 
bodybags while reports of mismanagement and lies about the justifications for war 
caused disillusionment among the American public. Congressional Republicans in the 
majority watched as Bush’s approval ratings plummetted and sought to avoid going 
down with the ship by curbing the authority they granted Bush during the first term. A 
popular battlefield for Congress to oppose the President occurred on defense 
appropriation and authorization bills. In 2005, the defense approrpriations bill was $4.4 
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billion less than Bush requested excluding the wartime supplement.173 Congress agreed 
to meet Bush’s proposed $1.1 billion for research and $716 million for new destroyers, 
but did so by trimming funds for Future Combat Systems, Transformational Satellite 
Communications, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.174 The related defense authorization 
bill called for $290 million less than Bush asked and authorized an emergency $50 
million for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq until Bush submitted a supplemental request 
in 2006.175 Congress used the defense authorization bill as a means of conducting 
oversight on Bush’s policies towards the conduct of the Iraq War and treatment of 
detainees. Congress required President Bush to submit quarterly reports on the 
progress of the reconstruction of Iraq and on benchmarks leading to American 
withdrawal.176 Bush wanted $441.8 billion for operations, maintence and personnel in 
Iraq, but Congress spent the money on weapons procurement and research and 
development while leaving Bush with $1.2 billion less than what he wanted for 
operations and maintence.177 Congress wanted to control costs on weapons and limit 
spending and mismanagement by the Pentagon. As a result, Congress capped the 
costs of destroyers, submarines, and Littoral Combat Ships, while forcing the military to 
fully justify the importance of Future Combat Systems before spending money on the 
program and requiring the Pentagon to reform its financial management systems before 
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it could conduct its own audits.178 Under the authorization bill, Congress granted 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba a limited right to appeal their detentions and Sen. 
John McCain (R-AZ) added an amendment banning the abusive treatment of terror 
suspects.179 Bush strongly opposed McCain’s amendment and threatened to veto both 
the appropriations bill and the authorization bill unless Congress removed the 
amendment.180 However, Bush backed down to McCain because there was enough 
support in both chambers of Congress to override a veto and the appropriations and 
authorization bills both passed by large margins. 
 The following year saw continued Congressional opposition to Bush’s requests in 
defense appropriations and authorization. Under the 2006 defense appropriations bill, 
the Department of Defense received $377.6 billion, but Congress categorized most of 
the funds as discretionary spending under the control of Congress.181 Only $256 million 
of the total amount was not discretionary, and the final total was $4.1 billion less than 
Bush requested.182 Bush threatened to veto any bill that was $4 billion less than what he 
requested, but the Senate ignored his threat and cut an additional $200 million as a 
result. The appropriations bill also halted the conversion of nuclear missiles into 
conventional missiles and ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Joe Biden (D-DE) added a provision prohibiting any permanent bases in 
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Iraq.183 On the 2006 defense authorization bill, Republican senators on the Armed 
Services Committee challenged President Bush on several issues including military 
personnel and their families, the conduct of the Iraq War, and plans to purchase 
weaponry.184 The Armed Services Republicans wanted more Americans in uniform with 
higher wages and more health care benefits.185 They also added $20 billion for new 
armor for soldiers and vehicles and denied Bush less funds for Future Combat Systems 
and the F-35, while authorizing unrequested funds for ships, submarines, and 
warplanes to be stationed in the home states of the senior Armed Services Committee 
members.186 Despite claiming some provisions to be optional, Bush had to comply with 
these proposals because both appropriations and authorization bills passed by margins 
greater than the number required to override his veto. 
 The Supreme Court ruled in the 2006 case Hamdan v Rumsfeld that detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay had the right to appeal their detentions in American courts.187 
President Bush resisted the Court’s decision based upon the language of the military 
authorization for Afghanistan and argued that al-Qaeda members warranted exceptions 
to the protections of the Geneva Convention.188 However, Bush conceded to the 
Supreme Court and began working on a draft with Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-
TN) to create military tribunals for the detainees’ trials, but Sens. John Warner (R-VA), 
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Lindsay Graham (R-SC), and John McCain, all Republican members of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, opposed several provisions Bush attempted to put in the 
legislation.189 Bush’s version of the bill reinterpreted the United States’ obligations under 
the Geneva Convention to allow torture of suspects, allowed the use coerced evidence 
during the trial in addition to classified evidence the defendants could not see, and 
permitted trials to occur without the defendant present in the court.190 Despite a 
contentious lobbying campaign from the White House, the trio of senators used their 
military backgrounds to win enough Congressional support to oppose Bush’s bill and 
forced the President to concede some provisions.191 Bush agreed to drop the ability to 
reinterpret the Geneva Convention and the ability to use classified evidence in trials.192 
Other members of Congress approved of the provision calling war crimes grave 
breaches of the Convention, but Bush managed to secure immunity from prosecution 
for the CIA agents that tortured terror suspects overseas.193 Several Democrats and a 
few Republicans however, opposed the continued ability to use coerced evidence for 
trials and the absence of habeus corpus rights for detainees during the military 
tribunals.194 Despite discontent over the remaining provisions Bush advocated, three 
Republican senators launched an effective challenge against the policies of the 
President and emerged victorious. 
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 In June of 2006, President Bush wanted to negotiate a nuclear agreement with 
India to build an alliance with India and exchange nuclear materials. However, India did 
not sign the UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a transfer of nuclear materials 
from the United States to a nation that did not comply with the treaty was prohibited 
under the Atomic Energy Act. To make the agreement work, Bush had to waive 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India, but to do this he needed the 
approval of Congress who demanded a substantial level of involvement in the 
negotiations.195 Bush agreed to make the agreement with India subject to a joint 
resolution of support from Congress in addition to reporting requirements Congress 
attached to keep it in the loop on the progress of the deal.196 Congress also reserved 
the right to call off the agreement if India detonated a nuclear weapon or broke any 
other agreement calling for non-proliferation.197 
2005-2006 # of actions # of deferent 
actions 
# of assertive 
actions 
# of successful 
assertive actions for 
Congress 
% of  successful assertive 
actions for Congress 
Substantive 20 3 17 13 76.47% 
Procedural 4 0 4 4 100% 
Informal 1 1 0 0 --- 
Congressional 
Procedure 
4 0 4 1 25% 
Total 29 4 25 18 72% 
Average Per 
Year 
14.5 2 12.5 9 72% 
 
 The first half of President Bush’s second term marks a complete reversal of 
Congressional involvement in foreign policy. Congressional foreign policy activity 
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jumped to levels nearly three times more than during the first term with a significant 
increase of four times as many assertive actions. Not only did Congress act more 
assertively during this period, but Congress was also more successful in getting their 
policy preferences into law with a substantial jump in success rates from 35% to 72%. 
Members of Congress watched as President Bush’s policies began to unravel in 2005 
because of the power they granted previously. Members of Congress, particularly 
Republicans in the majority, took themselves off the legislative bench to reassert their 
roles in foreign policy and correct the American trajectory on foreign relations. 
Committees (2005-
2006) 
Hearings Oversight 
Hearings 
% of 
Oversight 
Hearings 
Investigative 
Prints 
Total 
Committee 
Activity 
Average 
Committee 
Activity Per Year 
House Armed 
Services 
63 44 69.84% 1 64 32 
House Foreign 
Affairs 
141 49 34.75% 8 149 74.5 
House 
Appropriations 
Defense 
Subcommittee 
1 0 0% 3 4 2 
House 
Appropriations 
Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee 
12 1 8.33% 0 12 6 
Senate Armed 
Services 
42 16 38.10% 0 42 21 
Senate Foreign 
Relations 
69 27 39.13% 27 96 48 
Senate 
Appropriations 
Defense 
Subcommittee 
5 0 0% 0 5 2.5 
Senate 
Appropriations 
Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee 
4 0 0% 0 4 2 
Totals 337 137 40.65% 39 376 188 
Average Per Year 168.5 68.5 40.65% 19.5 188 ---- 
 Although the levels of committee activity remained relatively unchanged on 
average, the quality of these informal actions shows a more assertive Congress at work. 
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There were some increases and decreases among the individual committees, but it 
adds up to similar levels of committee activity seen during Bush’s first term. The 
Appropriations Subcommittees continued to conduct mainly hearings on legislative 
matters while the traditional committees handled the bulk of policy hearings and 
oversight. The percent of oversight hearings doubled from 21% to over 40% and the 
average number of investigative prints rose from 12.5 to 19.5. Instead of a quantitative 
increase in committee activity, Congressional foreign policy committees conducted 
more qualitative oversight hearings designed to check the President’s policies and rein 
back the mismanagements and failures that occurred during a period of deference to a 
once popular President. 
 The beginning of Bush’s second term involved a resurgence of Congressional 
assertiveness on foreign policy. After Congress saw the failures of the President’s 
policies and the problems of broad executive authority in foreign policy, Congress used 
the tools in its arsenal, mainly discretionary spending, to curb back the wasteful defense 
spending and mismanagment of the Iraq War. Congress also checked Presidential 
policies regarding detainees in Guantanamo Bay and kept Bush on a short leash during 
the nuclear negotiations with India. The fading popular support for Bush’s policies gave 
Congress the window it needed to assert itself and correct the failing policies of 
President Bush that Congress allowed when President had the patriotic support that 
September 11th created. 
2007-2008: Democratic Congress 
 The elections of 2006 proved to be historic because the Democratic Party scored 
major electoral victories and secured both chambers of Congress for the first time since 
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the Democrats lost control of Congress during the Republican victories of the 1994 
elections. Part of the Democrats successes can be explained by the failures of 
President George W. Bush on the Iraq War which created intense anti-Republican 
attitudes that dominated the electoral atmosphere. Many voters began equating the Iraq 
War with the Vietnam War as military quagmires in foreign countries. A major part of the 
Democratic campaign platform was the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and an end to a 
long and exhaustive war. 
 Despite the ambitious agenda of the Democrats, they had little success enacting 
legislation calling for troop withdrawals because the remaining Republicans rallied 
behind President Bush and denied the Democrats the support needed to overcome not 
just the filibuster in the Senate, but the Presidential veto as well. Congress first tried to 
establish a deadline of most of American forces out of Iraq by August of 2008, but the 
Senate compromised on setting the date as a goal to strive for rather than a formal 
deadline.198 The House agreed to the lesser version of H.R. 1591 because members of 
the House knew that the stricter bill they wanted would fail. Despite the bill passing the 
Senate, Bush vetoed H.R. 1591 and the House failed to gather two thirds approval for 
an override of the veto.199 The Democrats proposed another bill without a time table, but 
threatened to withhold funds for the war unless Bush reported on the progress of the 
Iraqi government.200 However, the Democrats backed down when Bush made speeches 
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during Memorial Day about the need for more troops in Iraq to finish the job.201 
Reluctantly, the Democrats gave Bush the funding he wanted for the Iraq War, but 
outlined eighteen benchmarks the Iraqi government had to meet and required Bush to 
report on the progress.202 The Democrats tried again when the President requested a 
$50 billion supplement to hold over the Department of Defense until Bush requested 
more funds for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.203 In H.R. 4156, Congress required the 
withdrawal of troops to begin within thirty days of enactment with the goal of most of the 
troops out of Iraq by December 15, 2008.204 The Defense Department could leave some 
troops in Iraq, but only for the purposes of conducting counterterrorist efforts, protecting 
U.S. personnel, and training the Iraqi military to take over.205 The bill also required 
complete military training for soldiers in Iraq and a prohibition on the torture of 
detainees.206 However, the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the bill after it passed the 
House, and Bush threatened to veto the Democrats’ omnibus spending bill unless they 
conceded to the President on Iraq.207 The Democrats agreed to add $31 billion in the 
2008 appropriations for Afghanistan only, but the Senate reworked the bill and 
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expanded the amount to $70 billion for either Iraq or Afghanistan while leaving out a 
timetable for troop withdrawal in Iraq.208 
 Despite their failure on withdrawing troops from Iraq, the Democratic Congress 
managed to scoring some successes against Bush on other parts of foreign policy. 
Congress continued its practices of denying Bush the funding he requested in the 
defense appropriations and authorization bills. The appropriations bill for the Fiscal Year 
2008 left out emergency funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because the 
Democrats were reluctant to fund the war in Iraq unless there were major policy 
changes, but ultimately left this issue out to deal with in the aforementioned bills so that 
they could pass the appropriations bill. The total amount Congress approved was 
$459.6 billions of which $459.3 billion was discretionary, and the total amount was $3.4 
billion less than Bush asked for.209 The Democrats used the appropriations bill to shift 
the priorities of defense spending towards more combat equipment, military training, 
battle gear for the National Guard and Army Reserve, and support for military families 
while allocating less for futuristic combat vehicles, weapons, and missile defense.210 
The defense authorization granted $500 billion in national security, but Congress 
rewrote the spending plans of President Bush to mirror their preferences of weapon 
procurement, personnel policy, military health care, and regulation of private defense 
contractors.211 However, Bush vetoed the original version of the bill because the Iraqi 
government opposed one of the provisions in the bill allowing lawsuits against the Iraqi 
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government, even if such injustices occurred under Saddam Hussein.212 As a result, the 
Democrats granted the President the ability to waive the provision to satisfy the Iraqi 
government.213 
 The defense appropriations for the next year continued to deny President Bush 
the amount of funding he requested. The fiscal year 2009 appropriations bill allocated 
$4 billion less than Bush requested while providing less for futuristic weapons and 
missile defense and more for the replacement of equipment for Iraq.214 The 
appropriations bill also allocated $452 million less for military personnel, $1.9 billion less 
for operations and maintenance, and $1.1 billion less for weapons procurement.215 
Congress diverted the cut funding away from these programs and towards the Defense 
Health Program and research and development.216 The related defense authorization 
bill allocated $611.1 billion which was $1.4 billion less than Bush requested and nearly 
all of the cuts came out of the $70 billion Bush requested for Irag and Afghanistan.217 
Again Congress denied increased funding for futuristic weapons and missile defense 
and used the money for equipment in Iraq.218 However, Congress left out several 
provisions that Bush threatened to veto the legislation over including bans on the use of 
private contractors for interrogations and combat operations, the requirement of 
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videotaping interrogations, and the necessity of Congressional approval for any future 
commitments of troops in Iraq.219 Other provisions that Bush opposed remained in the 
bill. Under the authorization bill, the Pentagon could not use funds for infrastructure 
projects in Iraq, establish permanent bases, control over oil resources.220 The Iraqi 
government also needed to share the costs of joint military operations, the Pentagon 
needed to report on their detention operations in Iraq, and the President had to submit 
reports concerning Iran’s nuclear program.221 In the President’s signing statement, Bush 
indicated that he reserved the right to disregard certain provisions, namely the ban on 
the use of funds to control oil resources in Iraq, and requirement of Iraq to share the 
costs of military operations with the United States.222 Despite previous concessions, the 
President scored a victory for himself by getting more than he requesting in 
supplemental war funding. Congress authorized $186.5 billion in unrestricted funding for 
Iraq and Afghanistan operations, even though Bush asked for only $183.9 billion.223 The 
House managed to pass a provision requiring withdrawals to begin within thirty days of 
enactment and end by December 31, 2009, but the Senate stripped the bill of all 
restrictions to pass the bill.224 
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 Although the Democrats did not enjoy as much success at their Republican 
predecessors did against Bush, they were able to enact some important pieces of 
legislation in foreign policy. The Democrats managed to force Bush to make revisions to 
the proposed trade agreement with Peru on labor and environment protections in order 
to get enough support for passage in Congresss.225 The Democrats also increased the 
severity of breaking the existing International Emergency Economic Powers Act to put 
more pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear program. Under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Enhancement Act, Congress increased the penalties on American 
companies for conducting business with sanctioned nations from $50,000 to $250,000 
or double the amount of the transaction depending upon which amount was higher.226 
The criminal penalties for such business also increased from $250,000 in fines and ten 
years imprisonment to $1 million in fines and twenty years imprisonment.227 The bill also 
left out any indications of a possible military strike against Iran.228 The House attempted 
to pass a stricter bill that banned all imports from Iran, labeled the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard as a terrorist group for the purpose of freezing their assets abroad, and removed 
the ability of President Bush to waive the existing sanctions from 2006 while expanding 
the list of industries that could be punished under the bill, but these provisions failed in 
the Senate.229 
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 After two years of negotiations, Congress revisted the nuclear deal with India for 
final authorization. The United States agreed to trade nuclear material with India while 
India agreed to the preconditions of international regulators like the IAEA and United 
States law.230 In order for Bush to make this deal, he needed to gain Congressional 
approval to waive provisions of the Atomic Energy Act that prohibited trading nuclear 
materials with non-signatories of the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty.231 Bush followed the 
conditions outlined in the 2006 law by reporting that India’s civilian program would be 
separate from its military program, India would allow the IAEA to send inspectors and 
implement safeguards, and India would be exempt from the restrictions of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group.232 Congress agreed to the pact with India, but included the ability to 
conduct oversight on any future nuclear agreement with India concerning the 
reprocessing of nuclear fuel.233 
2007-2008 # of actions # of deferent 
actions 
# of assertive 
actions 
# of successful assertive 
actions for Congress 
% of  successful assertive 
actions for Congress 
Substantive 27 7 20 9 45% 
Procedural 11 0 11 8 72.73% 
Informal 0 0 0 0 --- 
Congressional 
Procedure 
5 0 5 2 40% 
Totals 43 7 36 19 52.78% 
Average Per 
Year 
21.5 3.5 18 9.5 52.78% 
 
                                                          
230 United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. U.S. Public 
Law 110-369. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 October 2008. 
231 Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. U.S. Public Law 
109-401. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 18 December 2006. 
232 United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. U.S. Public 
Law 110-369. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 October 2008. 
233 United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. U.S. Public 
Law 110-369. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 October 2008. 
Congressional Foreign Policy 52 
 
 The latter portion of the Bush Presidency witnessed mixed results for 
Congressional involvement in foreign policy. The average amount of legislative activity 
from Congress rose again and doubled from 14.5 to 21.5. Although the number of 
assertive actions increased, the success rate for these policies dropped from 72% to 
52%. Despite this drop in successful assertiveness, Congress continued to be more 
assertive and successful on its agenda than during its period of deference during Bush’s 
first term. The increased amount of activity from Congress and the decreased 
successes stems from several of Congress’ attempts to establish a plan on the highly 
contentious issue to withdraw troops from Iraq. Although the Republicans challenged 
Bush in 2005 and 2006 to reform of the conduct of the Iraq War, a full withdrawal of 
U.S. forces from Iraq was not on their agendas. When the Democrats adopted the 
primary foreign policy agenda of withdrawals from Iraq, the remaining Republicans 
rallied behind President Bush and blocked any attempt to end the war.  
Committees (2007-
2008) 
Hearings Oversight 
Hearings 
% of 
Oversight 
Hearings 
Investigative 
Prints 
Total 
Committee 
Activity 
Average 
Committee 
Activity Per Year 
House Armed 
Services 
162 100 61.73% 10 172 86 
House Foreign 
Affairs 
217 69 31.80% 7 224 112 
House 
Appropriations 
Defense 
Subcommittee 
4 0 0% 2 6 3 
House 
Appropriations 
Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee 
5 0 0% 1 6 3 
Senate Armed 
Services 
49 20 40.82% 3 52 26 
Senate Foreign 
Relations 
73 25 34.25% 26 99 49.5 
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Senate 
Appropriations 
Defense 
Subcommittee 
5 0 0% 0 5 2.5 
Senate 
Appropriations 
Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee 
2 0 0% 0 2 1 
Totals 517 214 41.39% 49 566 283 
Average Per Year 285.5 107 41.39% 24.5 283 ---- 
 
 The committee actions during the last two years of the Bush Presidency 
coincides with the legislative activity in Congress. The average number of hearings and 
investigative prints rose to 285 and 24.5 respectively leading to a rise in the average 
amount of informal committee activity by nearly 100 actions with most of the work 
coming from the traditional foreign policy committees and not the Appropriations 
Subcommittees. However, the number of oversight hearings remained static at around 
41%. Instead of the qualitative increase between Bush’s first term and the first half of 
the second term, there was a quantitative increase between the first and second halves 
of the second term. 
 Under Democratic control, Congress continued the trend of assertiveness started 
by the Republicans in 2005 against President Bush, but ultimately failed to enact their 
policy preferences due to the partisan politics that dominated contentious issues like 
withdrawal from Iraq. The Democrats managed to claim some foreign policy victories on 
appropriations, trade agreements with Peru, sanctions against Iran, and limitations on 
the nuclear deal with India and specific provisions concerning Iraq, but the power of 
Bush’s veto and his support from the Republican party prevented the Democrats from 
achieving their major foreign policy goals of withdrawal from the Iraq War. The 
Democrats had to wait until their Democratic Presidential candidate, Sen. Barack 
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Obama (D-IL), won the Presidency in 2008 to achieve their goals scaling back troops 
from Iraq. 
Conclusion 
 On foreign policy issues, Congress is more likely to defer to the President when 
the President has popular support for his policies. Congress gave President Bush the 
policies he wanted because the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 created a “rally 
‘round the flag” effect that instilled patriotic passions among the American electorate 
and support for Bush’s national security policies and the global “war on terrorism.” The 
President already enjoys inherent advantages on foreign policy issues due to his 
powers to command the armed forces, negotiate with foreign dignitaries, and veto 
Congressional legislation, but the added support of the people makes it very difficult for 
members of Congress to oppose the President on foreign policy without appearing 
unpatriotic to their constituents. As a result, Congress took the deferent route and 
granted the President the policies he requested. When the President’s policies lose the 
support of the people and began to fail, as they did during the occupation of Iraq, 
Congress can pursue a more assertive foreign policy approach and challenge the 
President. In order to maintain Congressional levels of assertiveness, Congress needs 
to have a strong majority to overcome the President’s other advantages, which 
Congress obtained in 2005 to correct the conduct of the Iraq War, but lost it in 2007 
when the Democrats changed the Iraq agenda from correction to withdrawal. When 
Congress does get involved in foreign policy, it can use a wide variety of tools ranging 
from the traditional direct legislation to the more subtile use of procedural legislation and 
informal non-legislative tactics. The sucess of a Congressional challenge to Presidential 
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policies largely depends upon the ability of Congress to gather enough support to 
override a Presidential veto, which the Republicans accomplished in 2005 and 2006 
and the Democrats failed to do in 2007 and 2008. Other factors including the 
President’s desires to enact some form of legislation on issues like defense spending, a 
nuclear agreement with India, and trade relations with Peru allow Congress to draw out 
concessions from the President, but what separates the Republican successes in 2005 
and the Democratic failures in 2007 is the ability to gain enough support to override a 
Presidential veto. 
 The conclusions one can draw about the Presidency of George W. Bush are not 
limited to that time period alone because recent evidence concerning the current 
administration of Barack Obama reveals the foundations for the trend to start again. 
According to Stephen Weissman’s article in the Congressional newspaper, Roll Call, 
titled Congress is Abdicating its Authority on Wars, Congress deferred to the popular 
President Obama on several policies regarding the conduct of the war in Afghanistan 
and the Afghan government.234 Congress remained uninvolved in the foreign policy of 
President Obama and ignored messages from the American Embassy in Kabul, 
Afghanistan expressing deep concern about the implications of the President’s 
proposed surge in troop deployment to the country.235 These messages expressed 
concerns about the uncalculated variables of committing more troops to Afghanistan 
and the unreliability of the Afghan government.236 Afghan President Hamid Karzai 
“continued to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden....and his government had 
                                                          
234 Weissman, S. R. (2010, April 26). Congress is Abdicating its Authority on Wars. Roll Call. 
235 Weissman, 2010 
236 Weissman, 2010 
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little or no political will or capacity to carry out basic tasks over governance.”237 Despite 
poor political conditions and warnings from Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John 
Kerry (D-MA), Obama proceeded to send thirty to thirty-four thousand more troops into 
Afghanistan.238 Problems are now beginning to surface with President Obama’s 
proposals, and if the Democrats lose seats after the 2010 elections, Congress might 
reassert itself again as it did in 2005 against Bush, and challenge Obama on foreign 
policy issues including the conduct of the war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan for Obama 
will be analogous to Iraq for Bush and will drive members of Congress to reassert their 
roles in the game of American foreign policy formation.
                                                          
237 Weissman, 2010 
238 Weissman, 2010 
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